




















   
Religion, Meaning, Truth, Life 
FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS* 
In the last paper discussed at this conference, Steven Smith argues that
“religion” is not just another personal interest but properly remains
“constitutionally special.”1  It is distinctive, he says, in that it creates the
deep meaning without which humans cannot conceptualize themselves 
as persons.2  This unique capacity of religion to create thick, powerful 
meaning, he maintains, is what justifies retaining religion as a category
of constitutional doctrine.3 
Religion creates the transcendent narratives—even meta-narratives, as
Professor Smith writes, the “Meaning of meanings”—that give significance 
to human existence.4 
* © 2014 Frederick Mark Gedicks.  Guy Anderson Chair and Professor of Law, 
Brigham Young University Law School.  I am grateful to Larry Alexander and Steven 
Smith for the opportunity to participate in the rich conversations that took place at this 
conference, to Ron Garet, Roger Hendrix, Chip Lupu, Bill Marshall, and Michael Perry
for comments, criticisms, and encouragement on earlier drafts, to Galen Fletcher for his 
usual excellence in locating sources, to James Eagan for research assistance and 
insightful suggestions, and, for more than can be said, to Annie, Abby, Amanda, and
Nicea.
1. See generally Steven D. Smith, Why Religion is (Still) Constitutionally
Special (Aug. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that the 
view held by some that religion should not receive special treatment is the product of 
three significant problems: discrimination, justification, and definition).  Professor Smith 
did not intend for this paper to be published as part of the conference proceedings but
generously allowed it to be read and discussed because of its relevance to the conference
theme.
2. See id. at 49. 
3. See id. at 66. 
4. The evocative heading of the subsection that makes the crucial argument of 
Professor Smith’s thesis is “From meaning to Meaning . . . and religion.”  Id. at 28. 





































   
[B]elief in Meaning, or in a Story, is the sort of belief that typically elicits the
description of “religion.” . . . On this understanding, “religion” refers to the attempt
to discern and articulate a Meaning in life and the cosmos—or a Story—and to
live in accordance with that Meaning or Story.5 
From here Professor Smith builds to the conclusion that religion, alone 
among human endeavors, can explain why our lives are worth living.6 
[I]t is only by virtue of being part of the play that any of the character[]s can be
a character at all. Without a play, there would [be] no characters capable of
assuming distinctive personal identities or personalities.  In a similar way,
personal identity follows and presupposes personhood: in order to be a particular
person, one must be a person[.]  So, in this account, an individual’s . . . very
status as a person derives from her grounding in a larger Story.7 
In short, to believe in a larger meta-narrative or “Big Story” that
explains the meaning of life is not just to be religious but to be a person.8 
Everything else, he implies repeatedly, is just an interest, a preference,
or evolutionary randomness: 
The meaning-seeking rationale [for protecting the freedom of religion] advanc[es] 
claims that are neither about secular “interests” nor theological in nature.
Rather, the claims are about personhood. More specifically, the rationale does
not invoke “interests” (such as civil peace) that only contingently and indirectly
implicate religion, but instead focuses on that component of personhood (namely,
the search for and commitment to meaning) that correlates in an essential way 
with religion.9 
Like all of Professor Smith’s work, it is carefully written and argued. 
I learned a great deal from reading it.  In fact, I agree with much of it,10 
except the most important part—his principal thesis that religion is unique
in its power to create deep meaning for human lives.11  I do not think
that is right at all, so that is where I will focus my remarks. 
FRANÇOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE xxiii-xxiv 
(Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., University of Minnesota 1984) (1979). 
5. Smith, supra note 1, at 37–38; accord id. at 42–43. 
6. Id. at 5, 26–27 (citing Susan Wolf, Meaning in Life and Why It Matters 2 
(Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author)). 
7. Id. at 41. 
8. Id. at 48–49. 
9. Id. at 67; accord id. at 46–48, 58, 60–61. 
10. I once held a position close to Professor Smith’s. See generally Frederick 
Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989
WIS. L. REV. 99, 169 (“The individual autonomy and freedom that are at the heart of
liberalism would be well served by strong constitutional protection of religious group
autonomy in membership decisions.”). 
11. This is not a new argument, though Professor Smith presents it with 
uncharacteristic clarity and depth.  Other efforts have generally explored the purportedly
unique character of religion in descriptive or functional, rather than ontological, terms.
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* * * 
Professor Smith’s paper is shot through with the conventional Western
metaphysic of what we might call the “inside” and the “outside.”  The 
metaphysic starts with the assumption that “we,” each of us, are “in here,”
inside of ourselves, in our subjective minds, so to speak, while “out there” is
“Reality,” the objectively real world.  The task—one that has preoccupied 
philosophers for centuries—is to build a bridge from the merely subjective
in-here to the objective solidity of the out-there. The stakes of this project 
are thought to be the discovery of life’s meaning; its failure is the failure 
of that meaning.
So it is that Professor Smith refers to “subjectivity” and “objectivity,”12 
quoting various authorities who maintain that meaning is not “invented 
by ourselves, but rather detected,”13 that there is “the meaning of
life”14—as if there were only one—and that a “cosmic”15 authority exists
“beyond ourselves and our merely human devices and desires.”16  We 
are all, Professor Smith maintains, in the grip of the question, “What is 
the meaning of life?” (or, rather, the “Meaning” of life).17  As I have related,
he ultimately concludes that only religion can answer this question 
because only religion supplies a meta-narrative—a Cosmic Meaning or 
Big Story—that tells us who we are.18 
WESTERN TRADITION 99–102 (2006); Thomas C. Berg, “Secular Purpose,” Accommodations, 
and Why Religion Is Special (Enough), 80 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 24, 36–39 (2013),
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/Berg_
Dialogue.pdf; Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 42 (2000); Wilfred McClay, Honoring Faith in the Public Square, 
CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Nov. 2012, at 24, 29; Why Religion Matters: The Longing Within, 
CHURCH JESUS CHRIST LATTER-DAY SAINTS NEWSROOM (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.mormon
newsroom.org/article/why-religion-matters-longing-within. 
12. Smith, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
13. Id. at 25 (citing VIKTOR E. FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO LOGOTHERAPY 101 (Ilse Lasch trans., Beacon Press rev. ed. 1962) (1946)). 
14. Id. at 28. 
15. Id. at 29. 
16. Id. at 36 (emphasis added) (citing JONATHAN SACKS, THE GREAT PARTNERSHIP:
SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND THE SEARCH FOR MEANING 196 (2011)).
17. Id. at 28. 
18. See WITTE, supra note 11, at 102 (“Religion is a unique source of individual
and personal identity and activity, involving ‘duties that we owe to our Creator, and the 
manner of discharging them’ . . . .” (quoting JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance 
Against Religious Assessments, in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 299 (Robert A.
Rutland et. al. eds., University of Chicago Press 1973))); McConnell, supra note 11, at 
42 (including religion’s revelation of “ultimate reality” and its “connection to the
1071
 
   
 






   
 
 
    
   
    
   
 
 










    
    
  
 
Despite its deep entrenchment in Western thinking, the conventional 
metaphysic is an odd premise from which to derive an ontology.  There 
is never a time when human beings are separate from the world in which
they live and experience the very existence that makes them human.  As
philosopher Robert Solomon once observed, “The idea of a world known 
by us which is distinct from the one in which we act . . . is unintelligible.”19 
It is not for nothing that the conceptualization of the world as objectively
present before us, like a movie or a play, is called the “God’s-eye view.”20 
As Heidegger and others have shown, there is literally no time in which
each of us is not in the world alongside other beings and things that
constitute it and us.21  If we want to know what is true and real about the 
transcendent” among the characteristics that together make it unique); cf. Berg, supra
note 11, at 36–38 (emphasizing the ultimacy and comprehensiveness of religion, though
conceding that nontheistic and some nonreligious belief systems include these
characteristics).
19. ROBERT C. SOLOMON, CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY SINCE 1750: THE RISE AND 
FALL OF THE SELF 162 (1988). 
20. See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 49–50 (1981) 
(discussing the “God’s Eye point of view” as one where truth is “independent of 
observers altogether”).
21. See  MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 154–56 (John Macquarrie & 
Edward Robinson trans., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. 1962); Brian Leiter, Heidegger 
and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 YALE L.J. 253, 262–71 (1996) (summarizing similar 
views of other philosophers). 
Being and Time defies summary, but its basic (and revolutionary) move was to reject 
Western philosophy’s traditional separation of human “subject” from worldly “object” in 
favor of their being together at every moment. See  HEIDEGGER, supra, ¶¶ 18B–19, at 
122–25, ¶ 32, at 189–95. In the language of philosophy, Heidegger abandoned the 
Cartesian cogito and its hyper-detached “Archimedean” point of view for a vastly more 
intuitive human “Being-in-the-world.” See id. ¶ 6, at 41–49, ¶ 28, at 169–72. Human
being, in other words, is not first an independent and internally composed ego that 
reaches out to give meaning to the external world objectively present before it.  See id.
¶¶ 19–21, at 123–34.  Human being, rather, is always already in the world and alongside
other entities, including other human beings.  See id. ¶ 9, at 67–71, ¶ 12, at 82. This
human Being-in-the-world presupposes “a world that is not so much there ‘for us’ as one
from which we cannot distinguish ourselves.”  SOLOMON, supra note 19, at 162.  The 
“being” that humans have, therefore, the existence that makes us human, is necessarily a 
Being-in-the-world; there is never, and cannot ever be, a point in time when human 
being is prior to or separate from its Being-in-the-world.  See HEIDEGGER, supra, ¶ 13, at
89, ¶ 25, at 152. Human being, in other words, always finds itself embedded in
circumstances that are both given and concrete.  See id. ¶ 12, at 82.  As Professor Leiter 
succinctly puts it, “We exist practically absorbed in a world ‘already constituted,’ 
constituted precisely by the practical involvements we have with the things and people in 
it.”  Leiter, supra, at 271. Being and Time works out an ontology premised on Being-in-
the-world rather than with the traditional subject-object division.  See, e.g., JOSEF 
BLEICHER, CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSOPHY 
AND CRITIQUE 99–101 (1980); WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, HEIDEGGER: THROUGH 
PHENOMENOLOGY TO THOUGHT 27–47, 58–70 (3d ed. 1974); SOLOMON, supra note 19, at 
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world, we have to start with the fact that we are always involved in the 
world, not watching it from the outside.
* * * 
It may be that only religion can answer the question Professor Smith 
asks, but of course, what he asks might well be the wrong question—I 
will argue that it is. The better question, I submit, is not, “What is the 
meaning of life?” but rather, “What is the meaning of my life?”  Professor 
Smith, along with many others, no doubt thinks these are the same question,
but I hope to persuade that they are not or, at least, that one cannot easily
assume that they are. 
I will do so by relating a deeply personal narrative.  Such narratives 
are difficult to criticize because criticism seems necessarily to be a rejection 
of the person telling and interpreting his own story.  But that is a risk that
any storyteller must assume, and we are, in any event, not always the most
reliable interpreters of our own lives.  So, I have granted dispensation, so to
speak, to all those who wish to criticize, or even reject, my understanding
of the very personal experience I am about to tell.
Nicea and I have four children. Seventeen years ago, we lost our oldest 
child and only son, Alex.  He was attending college in North Carolina and 
died suddenly, in less than a day, from a rare and virulent bacterial infection.
Alex and I had a complicated relationship, as fathers and sons sometimes
do. But we both liked baseball.  My last and most vivid living memory 
of him was during a visit to see him shortly before he died, sitting with 
him in my hotel room eating hamburgers and rooting hard for the Indians
against the Marlins in game seven of the 1997 World Series, even as Indians
reliever José Mesa was melting down in the effort to save the game for
Cleveland in the ninth inning.
Alex was a baseball traditionalist—even more than I am—so we rarely 
rooted for American League teams—they have the designated hitter, after 
44, 45, 50, available at http://www.firstthings.com/article/2011/02/a-philosopher-in-the-
twilight.
Heidegger engaged in a notorious collaboration with the Nazi regime during 1933 and
1934, for which he never publicly apologized or expressed regret.  Some have urged that 
this irretrievably taints some or all of his philosophy.  Cf. Leiter, supra, at 262 n.35 (“The
fact that [Heidegger] was a Nazi, who later lied about his involvement with Nazism . . .
make[s] him an unattractive figure.”).  This unforgivable personal failing should not 
obscure the intuitive plausibility and analytic power of Being and Time’s insight that




   




















   
all, and that is just wrong (I allow myself to root for the Red Sox because 
my grandparents lived so much of their lives in Boston, but Alex would 
have none of that.) But the Marlins, though a National League team, 
were also a wild card team, meaning that they had a chance to win the 
World Series when they had not even won their own division! For us, this
was even more wrong than the DH, so we were rooting for Cleveland. I
think we both had this quixotic notion that maybe a wild card team would 
never win the Series, thus preserving some purity in the baseball playoffs. 
But alas, Mesa could not save the game for the Indians; it went to extra 
innings, and the Marlins won.  Less than three weeks later, Alex was gone. 
We are not alone in our family in having experienced profound loss, 
and so we are hardly unique in this or, frankly, most other respects.  I 
remember telling my mother in the hours after Alex’s death that there is 
nothing special about our family that should make us immune to tragedy
and loss.  If one is a believer, though, one’s faith tradition almost certainly
has a spiritual meta-narrative of the type Professor Smith describes in his
paper—a transcendent explanation of death that softens or even eliminates
its blow. Mormonism has one of these, an actually quite beautiful idea
of eternal family togetherness after death.  But it did not comfort me.  “Isn’t 
the Gospel wonderful!” people would exclaim, and I would think to myself, 
“Well . . . .” What I wanted in the wake of Alex’s death was to watch
another baseball game with him, but he is gone, and he and I will never
again watch a game together and root against the wild card team or the
American League, and no hope of eternal afterlife togetherness is going 
to change that. 
* * * 
What is real is supposed to be what is out there, objectively present
before us in the world, if not literally and physically, then at least
metaphorically and conceptually as a universal principal or a metaphysical
reality beyond the dimensions of Cartesian space.  My trouble was, and 
is, that what is most real to me is entirely in here—in my memories of
Alex, and of Alex and me together.  There are not enough of them, and this
is entirely my fault. 
Professor Smith talks about the “drama of Time,” and in this he is 
precisely correct.22  We are beings moving through time, and its passage 
22. Smith, supra note 1, at 34 (quoting John Wisdom, The Meanings of the Questions 
of Life, in THE MEANING OF LIFE: A READER 220, 222 (E.D. Klemke & Steven M. Cahn
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is truly dramatic.23  When we are young, life is full of possibilities; we can, 
almost literally, become anything. But as we move through life, these 
unnumbered possibilities drop away; they become fewer and fewer, until 
we meet death and all possibilities of being vanish forever, at least in 
this life.24 
The loss of my son filled me with deep and painful regret, not just for 
what might have been and now will never be but also for the memories I
do not now have and all the opportunities I missed—that I chose to 
miss—to share things like José-Mesa-wild-card-World-Series-meltdown.  
We both skied a lot, but I only went skiing with him twice.  A few weeks 
before he went away to college we went on a run together up in the hills 
above Provo Canyon.  I loved to run, but it was only the second time we 
ran together, and the last.  I was hard on him when I did not need to be, I 
was cheap when I could have been generous, and we disagreed and fought. 
But most of all, I regret the memories of me with him that I could have 
made but did not because I was off doing other things. 
I have three daughters, besides Alex, and I did not want to make that 
mistake with them.  The screenplay version would be that in a moment
of clarity occasioned by Alex’s death, I made a conscious decision to 
spend the time with them that I did not with Alex.  But the reality is that 
it was a series of small decisions, some barely conscious and many
prompted by Nicea, that one day grew into a big decision, almost before 
I realized it, that I would spend the time with my daughters that I did not
spend with Alex.  I began to make different choices, we spent money we
did not have, time I did not have; we were impractical to be with them.
My daughters are grown now, with families of their own. The closest
one lives 700 miles away in southern California, another is in the East, 
and the third now lives in Europe.  It has become a habit for Nicea and
me to make time to see them; I always visit them whenever I travel
anywhere near them on law school business (and, sometimes, even when
I am not traveling anywhere near them).  I have a great relationship with
23. Because human being is always at every moment in the world, it is structured 
temporally, as Heidegger implies in the title and proposes at the outset of Being and
Time. See HEIDEGGER, supra note 21, ¶ 5, at 38–39; see also id. ¶ 65, at 370–77.  All of 
the involvements of human Being-in-the-world are a paradoxical combination of 
belatedness, presence, and anticipation—past, present, and future.  See id. ¶ 32, at 188–
95, ¶ 41, at 235–41. 
24. See  HEIDEGGER, supra note 21, ¶¶ 49–51, at 291–99.  For a powerful and 
poetic account of this “Being-towards-death,” see Ronald R. Garet, Dancing to Music: 





   




















them, fed by memories of the many things we have done together. I still 
love my job too much, and still make decisions I regret, but these are 
many fewer. 
* * * 
Let me conclude by linking this narrative to constitutional doctrine 
and the theme of this conference.  Some time ago, my oldest daughter 
moved to Washington D.C. from Utah and needed my help to drive a rental
van across the country to her new place (“Adventures in Moving!”). This is
the same daughter who has hiked about 600 miles of the Appalachian
Trail with me.  We could have figured something else out, someone else
who could have driven with her, but I knew it was important for me to 
do this. So I did what I would never have done before Alex’s death: I 
cancelled multiple classes and scheduled inconvenient make-ups so that 
I could do this for her, and with her. 
I am fortunate to have a job that is flexible enough to enable decisions
like this. But what if I did not? If I were to tell my employer that I had
to have a day off because it is my Sabbath, a high holy day, or my child’s 
baptism, the employer will immediately understand the importance of the
request and may even feel a moral obligation, if not a legal one, to
accommodate it.  This would probably hold true even if I needed an entire 
week to, say, fulfill a special church calling. 
But if the request were not a religious one—if it were that I needed a 
day off to watch a daughter at a cheerleading or dance competition, or a 
week to go hiking with her or to move her across the country—what 
then?  An employer will certainly comprehend the request, but there would 
be no legal obligation for the employer to make any accommodation, and I
doubt there would be the same felt moral or ethical obligation to 
accommodate.  It would be difficult—impossible, I think—to plausibly
convey the painful truth of these situations as it manifested itself in my
life: It is as meaningful and important for me to do these ordinarily
unreligious things as it is to do any of the unambiguously religious things
I am committed to do as a believing Mormon, if not more so.  So, when 
a conference participant declared that a “purely personal decision” is not
a religious commandment and thus was not deserving of legal recognition 
and protection, I think he was wrong—although the better way to say 
this is, “That has not been my experience.”25 
25. Professors Berg and McConnell have made comparably broad assertions.  See 
Berg, supra note 11, at 36; Michael W. McConnell, Is Religion Special?, DESERET NEWS
(Nov. 20, 2011, 1:16 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700199256/Is-religion-
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I am a believer, yet I will also say that it is simply not correct that only
religion can offer deep meaning to life, and I can say this out of my own 
experience.  Ordinary activities can be crucial to the meaning of one’s life,
whether or not they are experienced or defined as “religious.”26  Though 
not all such activities are as morally serious as religious belief and practice, 
some are, and they are surely not “nihilistic” or “nothing” because they 
lack the character of transcendent religious truth.27 
The meaning of my life is that I lost my son and all that went with
that, and in the years that followed, I grew into the resolution that I would
not lose the same things with my daughters.  This is a powerful narrative, 
but it is not transcendent.  It is not a Big Story, but a little one; my story 
written for me, by me.  It is not The Meaning of Life, but the meaning of 
meanings as hedonism unworthy of respect and deserving of eradication.  See Kevin J. 
Hasson, Defending Religious Liberty for All, HERITAGE FOUND. (Lecture 1209, July 2, 
2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/lecture/2012/07/defending-religious-liberty-for-
all.  Hasson argues that
. . . [N]ever before have we had a situation where the fight is not between
[religiously] principled people fighting over their [religious] principles.  The 
fight is now between people who believe in something and people who believe 
in precisely nothing.  They are nihilists, and this is a threat that is simply
unprecedented. 
It is a fight not only over who God is, not only over if God is, but at the very
fundamental level, it is about who we are: whether we are a people who are 
born with our eyes focused on the far horizon and who seek to reach out and
grasp eternal truths, or whether we are accidental organisms adrift in a cold
and lonely universe where the only thing to do is try to wring whatever drops 
of pleasure we can out of an inherently absurd existence before we all lapse 
into nothingness. . . . 
That is the fight that we are in the middle of—repelling an assault by people
who believe in nothing against the very idea of believing in anything. 
Id.  Hasson is the founder and former president of the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty,
which has grown into a major social conservative ally in the contemporary culture wars.
See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, The Spirit and the Law: How the Becket Fund Became 
the Leading Advocate for Corporations’ Religious Rights, AM. PROSPECT (July 1, 2014), 
http://prospect.org/article/little-known-force-behind-hobby-lobby-contraception-case. 
26. One might, of course, include the narrative I have related within an expansive
definition of religion, though I did not experience it as religious myself.  The important 
point is that the religious potential of ordinary activities does not preclude them from 
having deep meaning, even if they are not connected to a religious meta-narrative. (I owe
this insight to James Egan.)
27. Cf. Hasson, supra note 25.  For a careful argument that religious belief is only 
one of many possible components of one’s moral identity and thus not deserving of 
protection distinct from that afforded other such components, see generally JOCELYN 
MACLURE & CHARLES TAYLOR, SECULARISM AND FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE (Jane Marie






    
my life.  But for all that, it is more meaningful to me than the meta-
narratives taught by my church in which I still have belief and hope,28 
and no less deserving of protection and respect.
28. See Frederick Mark Gedicks, Irony and Grace, 40 BYU STUDIES 213 (2001). 
1078
